Carlos pe~a ya llego a los 31 HR y eso es bueno,pero....con peros.
Pe~a en la actualidad tiene un promedio de bateo de apenas .216 Avg.
Poco mas de dos hit por cada 10 TB,mientras que por otro lado se poncha 3.5 en cada 10 TB.
De cada 28 TB de Pe~a 10 son ponches.
De esos 28 TB,6 son hits.
En los otros 18 TB (Despues de sacarle los 10 ponches a los 28 TB) hay una produccion de HR de 1.5 (aprox)
Pe~a aun terminara siendo lider de HR de la L A le cuesta ganarse el buen reconocimiento de la directiva y de la misma fanaticada y eso es gracias esa gran cantidad de ponches.
"Jonron o nada" sera' la filosofia de este hombre?
Mientras:La defensa contraria le sigue jugando cargada a la banda derecha,pero Pe~a no puede ver que la tercera base esta sola.

EE33 wrote:
"Jonron o nada" sera' la filosofia de este hombre?
Mientras:La defensa contraria le sigue jugando cargada a la banda derecha,pero Pe~a no puede ver que la tercera base esta sola.

jaja bueno de esa filosofia viven a dunn(hasta este año) ryan howard, y vivieron mcgwire, sosa, griffey jr (a partir de reds), adrew jones y una infinita lista.

y una nueva generacion tambien vivirá de eso.. por lo menos al principio de sus carreras
como por ejemplo jay bruce y carlos peña

no todos pueden ser pujols, morneau, a-rod, etc

con respecto a lo de las tendencias de tus batazos. no se aprende a batear para todos lados de la noche a la mañana, hay gente que nunca aprende..

cuando vean unos 3 batazos del vlad para el jardin derecho, se reajustará la defensa otra vez y listo.

La estrategia utilizada por los Rangers luce bastante extraña. El juego al que hace referencia EE33 debe haber sido en Anaheim, donde se enfrentaron hace poco los Angelinos y los Rangers. En ese estadio Guerrero ha bateado outs rodados y sencillos por todas partes, sin que exista preferencia por ningún sector. Y ha bateado cuatro dobles, dos por la raya de la izquierda y dos por la raya de la derecha, de manera que si lo que querían era evitar un doble debían haber puesto los defensores en las rayas de ambos lados. No ha bateado ningún triple, pero en los jonrones si ha habido una mayor frecuencia por el lado izquierdo, aunque en ese caso no importa donde coloquen a los fildeadores

Abajo les dejo un articulo del Wall Street Jounal en donde se habla sobre el tema. Yo sabia que habia leido algo sobre el particular hace tiempo aunque, no pensaba que era tanto tiempo pues el articulo es de abril del 2008:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120907935062743195.html

WEEKEND JOURNAL APRIL 25, 2008 Baseball Dares to Be Different
No Longer Hidebound, Team Managers Toss Their Own Rule Books By DARREN EVERSONAside from when they take umbrage with an umpire, baseball managers are obedient, orthodox people. For years, they've all basically managed the same way, arranging their hitters and deploying their pitchers in strict adherence to accepted practice. Even those nose-to-nose spats scream conformity.

But a number of major-league managers have been more creative this season, making moves that challenge the sport's sacred status quo. Pitchers -- generally the weakest hitters on National League teams -- are often batting before stronger-hitting position players in the Milwaukee Brewers' and St. Louis Cardinals' lineups. Three teams, influenced by nasty pregame weather reports, have used relievers as starting pitchers. And on the Atlanta Braves, the pitchers aren't always pitchers.

Managers of Invention: From left to right, the Texas Rangers' Ron Washington, Atlanta Braves' Bobby Cox and St. Louis Cardinals' Tony La Russa.
When Chris Resop, a Braves relief pitcher, was warming up in the bullpen during an April 3 game against the Pittsburgh Pirates, the coaches asked when he had last played the outfield. "I said a few years ago in the minors. And that's where they left it," Mr. Resop says. "I had no idea why they asked."

Braves manager Bobby Cox was desperate, and he was plotting an ingenious plan. He was nearly out of right-handed pitchers, and players can't re-enter a game after they've been removed. If Mr. Resop, a righty, could play the outfield, that would allow Mr. Cox to replace him on the mound temporarily -- and use a lefty specialist to pitch to Adam LaRoche -- without losing him entirely. So after Mr. Resop pitched to three batters in the top of the 10th inning, Mr. Cox had him go to left field. When Mr. Resop returned to the pitcher's mound one batter later, it marked the first time a pitcher had pitched, played the field and pitched again in the same game since Jeff Nelson of the Seattle Mariners in 1993, according to the Elias Sports Bureau.

Though Mr. LaRoche struck out, Mr. Resop allowed a go-ahead single after he returned to pitch. The Braves went on to lose, 4-3. But Mr. Resop says he still thinks it was a wise move, not to mention a fun one. ("I was ready to throw somebody out at home," he says.) Teams around the league took note. "We talked about what Bobby did," says Doug Melvin, the Brewers general manager. "We said, 'We've got to keep that in mind.' We thought about what pitchers of ours could do that. David Riske [a Brewers reliever] used to play shortstop."

Thanks to Mr. Cox's tenure and standing in the game (he ranks fourth on the all-time managerial win list) he has more latitude than most managers to try new things. But baseball has long discouraged such outside-the-box thinking, and the manager who makes an unusual move has to answer to second-guessing fans and reporters if it backfires.

"A blunder by a manager is a move that is A) unconventional, B) doesn't work and C) occurs at a moment of focus in the game," says Bill James, senior baseball-operations adviser with the Boston Red Sox. "If you put those three things together, you have a blunder. As long as you do what's conventional, you won't be accused of a blunder."

In recent years, however, the sport has grown more accepting of alternative views, and particularly of the statistics-based analysis pioneered by Mr. James. In addition, a new breed of owners who made their money in media or on Wall Street -- arenas where unorthodox ideas and strategies are more central to success -- has embraced forward-thinking, chance-taking front-office staff.

Second-year skipper Ron Washington, whose Texas Rangers had been pounded for years by Los Angeles Angels star outfielder Vladimir Guerrero, continues to employ a novel defense against him: the "infield shift," in which three infielders play on the left side of the diamond, preying on Mr. Guerrero's tendency to hit in that direction.

The shift has been around for decades -- it was used famously against Ted Williams, the Boston Red Sox Hall of Fame outfielder, and teams commonly use it today against David Ortiz, Jim Thome and other sluggers. The difference is that those are all left-handed hitters. Shifting against lefties is easier because, by shifting toward right field, the infielders have a reasonably short throw to first base. Conversely, right-handed hitters like Mr. Guerrero almost never face a shift.

It's worked for the Rangers, relatively speaking. Before Mr. Washington's arrival, Mr. Guerrero hit .431 with 20 home runs as an Angel against Texas, averaging a homer every 10.6 at-bats. Since Mr. Washington took over, Mr. Guerrero is hitting a still-robust .333, but with just one home run total in 84 at-bats. "Maybe, if nothing else, it gets in his head a little bit," says Jamey Newburg, author of The Newberg Report, a Rangers blog and annual book.

An Angels spokesman says Mr. Guerrero isn't focused solely on home runs, and that he has gotten base hits by hitting away from the shift. Mr. Guerrero is "somebody who's not affected by things," he says.

New York Yankees manager Joe Girardi, in his first month leading the club, let the weather forecast dictate his choice of starting pitchers in an April 9 game against the Kansas City Royals. He figured the game might be shortened due to rain, and didn't want to risk wasting Ian Kennedy, his scheduled starter.

Mr. Girardi made the unusual decision to start a relief pitcher instead -- in this case Brian Bruney. (The teams played through the rain, and the Yankees lost, 4-0 -- although Mr. Bruney held the Royals scoreless in his two innings. Mr. Kennedy came into the game in the sixth.) The San Francisco Giants and Los Angeles Dodgers used the same strategy in a game against each other on April 2.

In defiance of longstanding National League tradition to hit pitchers ninth and last, the Brewers this season began to hit their pitchers eighth, in front of catcher Jason Kendall on the days he plays. The decision was based on mathematics. The team -- whose principal owner, Mark Attanasio, is an investment banker who bought the club before the 2005 season -- computed that the move could bring an additional 30 runs scored over the course of the season, says Mr. Melvin, the Milwaukee general manager. Management figured Mr. Kendall's skill at getting on base would give the hitters at the top of the order more baserunners to drive in. Tony La Russa, manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, has been doing this as well.

No matter what the math says, though, whenever their weak-hitting pitchers come to the plate in a key, run-scoring situation, the Brewers invite dissent with their unconventional move. "I must say: I've got a wary eye toward the pitcher batting eighth," says Jim Powell, a Brewers announcer. "What the statistics can't show you is it undermines your No. 7 batter." The reason, he says, is opposing teams will pitch around the No. 7 batter, knowing the punchless pitcher is next.

But if Mr. Melvin had his way, the Brewers organization might be even more progressive. He has another counterintuitive idea: using relievers to start the game, and delaying the "starting" pitcher's entrance until the third inning or so. The thinking is that starters are typically among a team's best pitchers, yet nowadays they often pitch only through the fifth or sixth inning, well before many games are decided. By having them pitch later, they'd be around for the higher-leverage innings.

The idea would need to be tested first in the minor leagues, Mr. Melvin says. The only problem, it appears, is that it's too unconventional. "I can't get anybody to do it," he says.

Write to Darren Everson at darren.everson@wsj.com

Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page W1

La estrategia no es mala, si el bateador no se sabe ir a la banda contraria o en el peor de los casos no lo hace con poder yo prefiero un hit para la banda contraria que un home run, claro que en casos que haya hombres en posición anotadora y el bateador se sabe ir a la banda contraria bueno ya ahi habría que hacer el ajuste. A mí me parece que en ciertos casos tiene similitud con el movimiento de pegar a los infield de esquinas a la raya sacrificando el hit para trata de evitar el extrabase. Asi lo veo yo.

Si la idea es que Guerrero batee menos jonrones y empuje menos carreras, como se afirma en el artículo presentado por Manuel, el manager de Texas ha logrado su objetivo en esta temporada. Guerrero ha bateado menos jonrones (1 cada 34 turnos al bate contra los Rangers vs. 1 cada 26 turnos en la temporada) y menos carreras empujadas (1 cada 17 turnos contra los Rangers vs. 1 cada 8 turnos en la temporada). Guerrero ha empujado solo 2 carreras (una de ellas producto de un jonron) y dejado 11 corredores en base contra los Rangers. A cambio, Guerrero ha bateado muchos más hits y dobles. Guerrero batea en la temporada para .299 y contra los Rangers tiene .412. En cuanto a los dobles: Guerrero ha bateado 1 en cada 26 turnos en la temporada y contra los Rangers 1 en cada 17 turnos. Parece que el manager Washington piensa como Jonnhy.V: prefiero un hit para la banda contraria que un home run. La estrategia no ha sido tan mala, como afirma Jonnhy.V, si tenemos en cuenta que Texas tiene record positivo de 5-3 contra los Angelinos, en esta temporada, cuando han alineado a Guerrero

Hay manegers que sienten un gran respeto por algunos jugadores contrarios,pero lo del maneger de Texas Ron Washington por Vladimil Guerrero ya llega a TERROR.
Asi lo confirma el Box Score del partido de fecha 5 de Agosto del 2006.
En ese partido V.Guerrero se embaso' 4 veces por BB,tres intencionales y la otra semi intencional,luego de esas 4 BB (en el 8vo) cuando ya Ron Washington tenia el juego perdido 9 por 3 fue que decidio pitcharle y Guerrero fallo con un tablazo a lo profundo del jardin derecho.